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Abstract
A specific day-trading policy in Taiwan futures market allows an investigation of the performance of
day traders. Since October 2007, investors who characterize themselves as “day traders” by closing their
day-trade positions on the same day enjoy a 50% reduction in the initial margin. Because we can identify
day traders ex ante , we have a laboratory to explore trading behavior without the contamination of potential
behavioral biases. Our results show that the 3,470 individual day traders in the sample incur on average
a significant loss of 61,500 (26,700) New Taiwan dollars after (before) transaction costs over October
2007-September 2008. This implies that day traders are not only overconfident about the accuracy of their
information but also biased in their interpretations of information. We also find that excessive trading is
hazardous only to the overconfident losers, but not to the winners. Last, we provide evidence that more
experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day trading behavior, although they do not learn
their types or gain superior trading skills that could mitigate their losses.
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1. Introduction
Day traders are both controversial and mysterious. Little research has been devoted to their in-
vestment behavior and performance mainly because we have lacked a way to identify them and
to track their trading history. Most studies on their behavior are limited by indentification ex post
as completing at least one round-trip trade on the same trading day. Such an ex post identification
strategy may obscure the traders’ motive of profiting solely from the anticipation of short-term
price movements. Trading behavior may be the result of other motives, including liquidity needs,
portfolio rebalancing, or anticipation of tax law changes.
Ideally, researchers would like to have an ex ante way to identify day traders who trade only
for profit as this would yield a more accurate documentation of their trading activities. We take
advantage of a policy implemented in the Taiwan futures market that provides a clear-cut way to
identify day traders ex ante, and study their trading behavior.
On October 8, 2007, the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) implemented a new margin
requirement policy that allows investors to specify orders as day-trade orders and deposit half of
the required margin. When a day-trade order is executed successfully, the position must be closed
before the end of the trading day. Essentially, an investor commits to be a “day trader” ex ante.1
Previous studies have relied on executed transactions to identify day traders. In our case, day
traders reveal themselves by submitting the specific day-trade orders. Hence, we can focus on
traders identified by their day-trade orders rather than investors who merely buy and sell the same
security on the same day. 2
Our contribution is to take advantage of this margin rule on the TAIFEX to examine several
questions: Are these day trades profitable? Are the day traders susceptible to the overconfident
bias in terms of information precision and biased in interpretation of information? Do they lose
1Suppose that the original initial margin is 100,000 New Taiwan Dollars (TWD). Normally, the maintenance
margin is set at 75 per cent of the initial margin, or 75,000 TWD. In other words, a day trader can incur as much as
25,000 TWD before receiving a margin call. The 75 per cent rule does not apply to the halved margin (50,000 TWD)
for a day trader. In fact, a day trader is still allowed to lose up to 25,000 TWD before paying the variation margin.
Therefore, by committing to day trades, an investor actually doubles its trading leverage.
2Henceforth, day trading refers to transactions executed by day-trade orders, and day traders are investors who
submit day-trade orders.
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more money by trading more contracts? In other words, is trading hazardous to their wealth? Is
there any difference in the relation between trading frequency and performance among winning
and losing day traders? Finally, do day traders ever learn from their past trading experience and
performance?
The first question is related to the research by Harris and Schultz (1998), Jordan and Diltz
(2003), Garvey and Murphy (2005), Linnainmaa (2005), and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2011).
Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) investigate the second and the third questions for
regular individual investors, respectively. We believe that it is worth revisiting these questions
with our day trader sample. In addition, exploration of the last two questions should give us a
more complete picture of the investment behavior of day traders.
Several features motivate us to answer these questions by studying day traders in the Taiwan
futures market. First, day traders in the TAIFEX have to close their positions before the end of
the day, which engenders liquidation risk in addition to the market risk. Intuitively, those who
engage in day trading should be either the most informed or the most confident that they are the
informed as they are willing to take on extra liquidation risk for a reduced margin. If the former is
the case, day trades should deliver a positive average return. This unique institutional setup gives
us a better lens to reexamine the issue of investor overconfidence, when day traders believe that
they possess valuable information but in fact they do not.
Second, the maximum investment horizon for day trades is just one day. Therefore, the re-
alized end-of-day positions of our day traders are not related to intra-day returns. This is an
important feature, as we can observe day traders’ positions without the impact of the disposition
effect.3 Nor do we need to calculate average returns of several holding periods to accommodate
different investment horizons for investors as in Odean (1999).
Third, our day traders can easily capitalize on negative information by taking short positions,
because there are no short-sale constraints in the futures market. Jordan and Diltz (2003) point
3Barber and Odean (2000) use monthly holding positions and calculate monthly returns to avoid such bias. By
doing so, they need to assume that trading takes place on the last day of the month and also ignore intra-month
trading.
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out that the conventional Wall Street wisdom holds that day trading is profitable when the overall
market is trending up. One explanation is the high cost of selling stocks short. The cost of shorting
futures contracts, however, is the same as going long. We are thus able to study the performance
heterogeneity among day traders by examining the difference in profitability of both short and
long day trades and of trades from both winning and losing day traders. Most interestingly, we
can also investigate the learning process of day traders in the TAIFEX.
Finally, it is apparent that our day traders are not trading for consumption or liquidity needs
as they cannot spend the proceeds from selling short. Instead, they have to deposit the margin.
Portfolio rebalancing or diversification are unlikely to be behind day trades, because they are
doomed to liquidation before the closing of a trading day. Moreover, there is no capital gains tax
in Taiwan.
Overally we can safely conclude that the main purpose of submitting day-trade orders is to
leverage up a position to maximize the trading profit from speculating on short-term price move-
ments. The Taiwan futures market provides us with an ideal environment to answer our questions.
Using the complete trading record in the TAIFEX from October 8, 2007 through September
30, 2008, we find that for domestic individual day traders, the average net profit for a round-
trip trade is −613 TWD (one US dollar is roughly 32 TWD during our sample period). The
3,470 individual day traders on average incurred a significant aggregate loss of 61,500 TWD after
accounting for transaction costs. According to Odean (1999), this result implies that individual
day traders are overconfident regarding the precision of their information. Before transaction
costs, individual day traders still suffered an average of 26,700 TWD loss. This indicates that
day traders are not only overconfident but also have a biased interpretation of the information.
For institutional day traders, results are similar but statistically insignificant because of a much
smaller sample.
We also find that numbers of short positions and long positions are similar for individual day
traders when we differentiate the direction of round-trip trades. Individual day traders are not as
reluctant to short as US individual investors. Interestingly, the average profit of short-initiated
3
round-trip trades is higher than that of long-initiated round-trip trades for individual investors,
with a 160 TWD profit for short positions and a 676 TWD loss for long positions. This implies
that when individual investors are short selling, they are less overconfident and more careful than
when they are taking long positions.
Note that because the above analysis is based on the money profit of a single round-trip day
trade, the results might be subject to a scaling issue. In particular, a day trader with a large margin
account size in terms of the amount of deposited initial margin is able to trade more futures
contracts in a round-trip trade and is thus exposed to a high level of profit and loss. Ideally, we
should calculate the genuine realized returns for day traders based on the information about their
margin account size. Unfortunately, such information is not available. Having said that, we do
calculate two types of return, namely, index return and net return, to address the potential scaling
issue.
The index return of a round-trip day trade for a day trader is computed as the aggregate gained
or lost index points divided by the average longing or short-selling index point. This return
should be able to largely alleviate the scaling concern even though it does not fairly reflect the
true realized return for a day trader. In view of this, the net return, which is defined as the net
profit from a single round-trip trade divided by the total initial margin required to complete the
trade, helps us to gauge the realized return of a trader. For a typical individual trader who always
deposits just enough money in his/her margin account for a round-trip day trade, this net return
would be identical to his/her realized return. Note that this net return is calculated under the
assumption that there is no margin call whatsoever due to the lack of margin account information.
We find that the average index return and net return for individual day traders are −0.22
per cent and −3.73 per cent, respectively. Both of them are significantly negative. The median
returns are negative and significant as well. These results suggest that individual day traders in
the TAIFEX are not only overconfident about the precision of their information, but also biased in
interpreting their information. Moreover, we find that the median net return for a short-initiated
day trade is −1.36 per cent, much higher than the median net return of −2.77 per cent for a
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long-initiated day trade. These results are consistent to those using trading profit in TWD as the
performance measure. Given the data limitation that we do not have the detailed margin account
information, we still rely on the trading profit in TWD as our main variable of interest as it reflects
accurately the investment performance each day trader has.
In addition, we discover a smirk relation between trading frequency and performance of day
traders. Estimating a quantile regression of profits on the number of traded contracts by every fifth
percentile, we find that, below the 15th percentile in profit, the more the day taders trade, the more
loss they incur. For day traders above the 60th percentile, the more they trade, the more profit
they make. Collectively, the documented relation between the profit and the number of contracts
suggests that trading is hazardous only to the wealth of overconfident losers, but not to that of
the informed or skillful winners. This result extends the finding of Barber and Odean (2000) that
trading is hazardous to the wealth of individual investors and is also consistent with Barber, Lee,
Liu, and Odean (2011), who show cross-sectional differences in the trading skill of day traders in
the Taiwan stock market. 4
Finally, we find that the more experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day
trading behavior. Furthermore, profits earned in the past are linked only weakly to day trading
activity. Higher past profits alone do not contribute to more intensive day trading activity. This
result also shows that overconfident day traders do not learn their own ability from their past
performance as suggested by Gervais and Odean (2001). Trading experience plays a limited role
in guiding individual investors to earn profits by taking advantage of the extra leverage enabled
by the new day trading policy.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the literature most
closely related to our work. Section 3 describes the data on the Taiwan futures market. Section 4
outlines our empirical approach, and presents our main results and confirming tests. Conclusions
and a summary of our findings are provided in Section 5.
4Note that the day traders in Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2011) are identified ex post as well.
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2. The literature on day trader behavior and overconfidence
bias
We first provide a brief literature review as context for our study of both day traders and their
overconfidence biases.
2.1. Day traders
Harris and Schultz (1998) use Nasdaq’s Small Order Execution System to analyze the perfor-
mance of individual day traders. Their data include around 10,000 round-trip trades over a three-
week period. Their individual day traders earn a small average profit, even trading with market
makers. Jordan and Diltz (2003) examine the profitability of a sample of 324 US day traders. They
show that there are about twice as many day traders who lose money as those who turn a profit.
They also document that around 20 per cent of sample day traders are better than marginally
profitable. Garvey and Murphy (2005) report consistent intraday trading profits by 15 proprietary
stock traders over 96,000 trades in three months in 2000. Garvey and Murphy (2004) use the
same data and find that those traders earned more than $1.4 million in intraday trading profits.
Rathre than studying the behavior of a small number of US day traders, Linnainmaa (2005)
and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2011) examine a large sample of day traders in two interna-
tional markets. Linnainmaa studies a Finnish data set of 22,529 day traders over January 1995
- November 2002. He shows that individual day traders are reluctant to close losing day trades,
which consequently hurts their performance by as much as 6 per cent in the three months after a
holdings change. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean document great variation in gross and net returns
earned by day traders on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1992 through 2006. They find that the
spread in returns between top-ranked and bottom-ranked day traders exceeds 60 basis points per
day.
All these studies focus on day traders in stock markets and provide mixed evidence on prof-
itability. Their results may be contaminated by the disposition effect, however, because these
6
sample day traders are identified ex post. The disposition effect demonstrates that individual in-
vestors are inclined to close profitable positions quickly, but hold losing positions as long as they
can. Thus these studies of the performance of day traders may be biased upward because of the
disposition effect.
We provide new evidence on the performance of day traders in the Taiwan futures market,
where investors commit to day trading ex ante. Since the positions of ex ante day traders will be
closed before the closing of the trading day, irrespective of profit or loss, the disposition effect
is largely mitigated. Performance evaluation is also free of noises due to other trading needs or
behavioral biases. To the best of our knowledge, Holmberg, Lo¨nnbark, and Lundstro¨m (2013) is
the first study of the profitability of day trading strategies in the futures market. They propose a
way to assess the success rate of trades and profitability of a popular day trading strategy called
the Open Range Breakout (ORB) strategy. When applying the strategy to US crude oil futures
market, they find an impressive success of ORB strategies. In this paper we attempt to explore,
with the help of unique data, the behavioral biases of day traders in the futures market. We thus
add to the literature by providing a new perspective.
2.2. Investor behavioral biases
There is a plethora of literature on investor behavioral biases. We only briefly discuss the most
relevant, namely, papers focusing on investor overconfidence and the disposition effect. Odean
(1999) and Barber and Odean (1999) use discount brokerage accounts to demonstrate that overall
trading volume in equity markets is excessive. They show that investors are not only overconfident
about the precision of their information but also biased in their interpretation of that information.
Barber and Odean (2000) show that individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay
a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Those who trade the most earn an annual
return of 11.4 per cent compared to a market return of 17.9 per cent during 1991 - 1996. They
attribute their findings to investor overconfidence.
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Barber and Odean (2001) further explore overconfidence by men versus women, and find that
men trade 45 per cent more than women. Their results show that trading reduces men’s net returns
by 2.65 per cent a year, compared with 1.72 per cent for women. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean
(2009) analyze the complete trading history of all stock investors in Taiwan over 1995 - 1999
and find that individual investor trading results in systematic and economically large losses. They
argue that investor overconfidence is one of the major reasons.
In addition to the overconfidence bias, individual investors are shown to exhibit the disposition
effect. Heisler (1994) documents that small speculators in the Treasury bond futures market
exhibit loss aversion. They tend to hold trades that incur an initial loss significantly longer than
those that show an initial profit. Jordan and Diltz (2004) show that approximately 62 per cent
of sample day traders hold losing transactions longer than profitable ones and conclude that their
sample day traders exhibit the dispostion effect. Using data on a US proprietary trading team,
Garvey and Murphy (2004) find that even professional traders sell their winners too soon and
hold on to their losers too long. Overall, the disposition effect is determental to the trading
performance of individual investors. Locke and Mann (2005) document that the ability to close
open positions promptly is an important success factor for a professional futures trader. Holding
on to both losing positions and winning positions too long will have negative effects on trading
performance.
Our day traders have to close their positions before the end of the day in exchange for a halved
margin deposit. Their commitment ex ante to liquidation intuitively makes them ideal candidates
for studying overconfidence because they have the strongest belief that they are informed or have
trading skills.
3. Data description
Futures contracts on the TAIFEX are traded by an electronic trading system (ETS) from 8:45 AM
to 1:45 PM. After the opening call auction at 8:45 AM, the TAIFEX operates as an electronic
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continuous auction market before the closing auction at 1:45 PM. During regular trading hours in
the continuous auction market, all submitted orders are matched on a real-time basis according to
price and time priority without the intermediation of designated market makers.
Investors are allowed to submit both market orders and limit orders to the ETS. Market orders
to buy or sell more contracts than the amount currently oustanding at the best price levels would
have to ”walk up or down the book.” Orders on the TAIFEX are valid only for the current trading
day and would not be included in the limit order book on future trading days even if they are not
successfully executed. Order and transaction information for futures contracts is disseminated to
the public on a ”real-time” basis using an electronic screen, with information on the last traded
price, transaction volume, the best five bid and ask prices, and the trading volumes desired by
investors to trade at these prices.
The four major contracts traded on the TAIFEX are the Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures
(hereafter TXF), which is based on all listed stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange; the mini-
Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (hereafter MXF), whose payoff is only one-quarter of
the TXF; the Electronic Sector Futures (hereafter EXF), which is based on the Taiwan Stock
Exchange Electronic Sector Index; and the Finance Sector Futures (hereafter FXF), which is
based on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Financial Sector Index.
Our data include all trades from October 8, 2007 through September 30, 2008. In each transac-
tion, we observe the investor’s account number, investor type (individual or institutional), contract
type, and other relevant information. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all the transactions
in the sample period. The first observation worth emphasizing is that futures market trading is
dominated by individual investors. Individual investors are responsible for 71 per cent of total
transactions, higher than the percentage in the Taiwan stock market (63 per cent in 2008 and 72
per cent in 2009). The majority of the transactions take place on the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Index, with 54 per cent on the TXF and 33 per cnet on the MXF. The Electronic and Financial
Sector Index Futures account for 5.6 per cent and 5.4 pre cent, respectively, while all other futures
account for less than 1.3 per cent.
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On October 8, 2007, the TAIFEX implemented a new margin requirement policy to boost the
trading volume of the index futures. For the major four index futures ( the TXF, MXF, EXF, and
FXF), the initial margin requirement is reduced by 50 per cnet if an investor indicates an order as
a day-trade order. When a day-trade order is successfully executed, the position has to be closed
by the investor before 1:30 PM, 15 minutes before the market close. Otherwise, the position will
be forced to close by the TAIFEX through either a market order or a limit order that is five ticks
within the latest trade. In other words, the maximum duration of an index futures position that is
initiated by a day-trade order is less than five hours.
In the US, “pattern day traders” are defined as investors who trade the same stock four or more
times in five business days. In this study, index futures investors are defined as day traders if their
positions are established through day-trade orders. Our definition is thus different from that in the
US as we have a clear way to classify day traders ex ante.5
4. Performance of day traders in the Taiwan futures market
Our main research questions include: Are day trades profitable? Are day traders susceptible to
overconfidence biases with regard to the precision and interpretation of their information? Do
they lose more money by trading more contracts? Is there any difference in the relation between
trading frequency and performance between winning and losing day traders? Finally, do day
traders’ past trading experience and performance affect their trading behavior?
We provide evidence on these questions in turn. Our results shed light on the possible behav-
ioral biases for the most aggressive individual traders in the market.
5Under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), investors who are deemed pattern day traders must have at least $25,000 in their accounts. See
http://www.sec.gov/answers/daytrading.htm for more details.
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4.1. Definition of day traders and round-trip trades
To analyze the performance of day traders, we first have to identify day trades. We thus exclude
transactions not initiated by day-trade orders. Second, we need to convert raw transactions into
completed round-trip trades. Essentially, a round-trip trade occurs when an initiated position,
long or short, is covered. The profit of a round-trip trade can be calculated when an investor’s
net position for an index futures is back to zero again. We calculate the payoff of a round-trip
trade following Jordan and Diltz (2003) and Feng and Seasholes (2005). Finally, we include in
the analysis only investors who conduct more than five day trades during the sample period.
Summary statistics of raw transactions by day traders are shown in Table 2. Transactions are
reported separately for domestic individual and institutional day traders. There are 1.42 million
contracts traded by individual day traders and only 44,000 contracts traded by institutional day
traders. The average trade size of domestic individual day traders is about 1.5 contracts compared
to 1.7 contracts for institutional day traders.6 Except for the first month, we see more than 1,000
individual day traders each month.7 The number stabilizes at around 1,500 per month in the later
half of the sample period.
Only a few institutional investors conduct day trading, averaging at 14 per month. Although
institutional day traders account for only 3 per cent of the day-trade contracts, it is worth spending
some time in studying whether their performance differs from the performance of individual day
traders.
4.2. Performance of aggregate round-trip day trades
Before we calculate performance at a day trader level, looking at how average round-trip trades
perform offers us a general picture. The results in Table 3 suggest that both individual and insti-
tutional day trades generally perform poorly after taking transaction costs into account. Interest-
ingly, there exists asymmetry between the long-initiated and short-initiated trades by both types
6There is barely any foreign individual day trading on the TAIFEX.
7The identity of day traders could be different each month. In total, we have 3,470 individual day traders.
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of day traders.
Panel A reports the profit of all the round-trip trades by individual and institutional day traders.
There are 348,000 round-trip day trades by individual investors. On average, one round-trip day
trade loses 266 TWD; after commission fee and transaction tax, the loss drops to 613 TWD.
Both figures are statistically significant. 8 While the average profit of a round-trip trade for insti-
tutional day traders is also negative, it is not significant at conventional significance levels. The
significantly positive median profits of round-trip trades by individual and institutional day traders
suggest a skewed distribution in the round-trip trade profit, implying performance heterogeneity
among day traders on the TAIFEX.
Panels B and C report profits for long-initiated and short-initiated round-trip trades by both
types of day traders. Numbers of long and short positions are similar for the individual day
traders. Unlike the stock day traders in the literature, our sample individual day traders are not as
reluctant to short as we anticipated.
Several reasons might explain this result. First, the cost of initiating a long or short position
is symmetric in the index futures market. Second, the daily downside risk is capped at 7 per cent
because of price limits in the Taiwan stock market. Third, the margin call, which is normally
about 25 per cent of the initial margin, also limits the exposure of day traders to downside risk.
Turning to performance, we discover an intriguing asymmetric pattern in the long and short
positions for different types of day traders. While individual long day trades perform most poorly
with gross and net profits of −676 and −1,014 TWD, short positions yield an average positive
gross payoff of 160 TWD and an average loss of 196 TWD after transaction costs. This result sug-
gests that when they are shorting, individual day traders are more cautious and less overconfident
than when they are taking long positions.
In the case of institutional day traders, however, the average payoff for long-initiated round-
8The transaction tax of Taiwan futures market is 0.8 basis point for initiating or closing one contract. The com-
mission fee varies for different types of investors and across different brokerage firms. Although comprehensive
commission fee data are not available, the average commission fee for initiating or closing a contract is around 37.5
TWD according to a press release from the Ministry of Finance on October 4, 2008. We thus apply this fee to all the
transactions we analyze.
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trip trades is much higher than that for the short-initiated ones, with a difference of 12,274
(12,339) TWD including (excluding) transaction costs. Given the larger trade size of each round-
trip trade as shown in Table 2, gains and losses are much greater for institutional day traders.
The crucial insights here are the generally poor performance of day trades and the performance
heterogeneity in both types of trades and types of traders.
4.3. Overconfident day traders
Odean (1999) argues that individual investors may be overconfident in two ways. First, individual
investors believe that they have relevant information, but actually they have none, and they are
overconfident about how to interpret their information. In other words, they have biased inter-
pretations of information. Second, individual investors may overestimate the precision of their
information signals, if they are indeed informed.
Odean develops tests for the null hypotheses of biased interpretation of information and of
overconfidence in the precision of information. If individual investors are overconfident about
their ability to interpret information correctly, average gross trading profits should be very close
to zero or negative. If individual investors are overconfident in the precision of their information,
however, average net trading profits after transaction costs should be about zero or negative. We
apply Odean’s tests to determine whether our sample individual day traders are overconfident or
not.
With the payoff of every round-trip day trade, we can aggregate trades at investor level over
our sample period to gauge profitability. Following Jordan and Diltz (2003), Table 4 reports the
distribution of the gross and net profits for day traders with 50,000 TWD in each bin. We also
show performance separately for long-initiated and short-initiated day trades. In total, we have
3,470 individual day traders who submit day-trade orders on at least five trading days during our
sample period. The fact that the numbers of day traders taking long and short positions are similar
implies that most of the day traders trade in both directions.
If day traders are rational, they should be the most informed or have the best information
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processing technology, as they are willing to bear the risk of forced liquidation before the end of
the trading day. They must believe that the benefit of extra leverage, with a 50 per cent reduc-
tion in initial margin allowed for day-trade orders, outweighs the risk of premature liquidation.
Alternatively, individual day traders may simply overestimate the precision of their information.
Therefore, following Odean (1999), our first null hypothesis is that the net profit of individual day
traders should be greater than or equal to zero.
The results in Table 4 clearly reject the null hypothesis. An average individual day trader
incurs a significant loss of 61,500 TWD after transaction costs during the whole sample period.
While the sample average might be driven by outliers, the significantly negative median alleviates
that concern. Besides, not even 20 per cent of the individual day traders make positive net prof-
its. With no other reasons to trade such as tax filing or liquidity demand, our evidence strongly
corroborates a conclusion that individual day traders are overconfident as to the precision of their
information signals.
The second question is whether day traders are systematically misinterpreting information
available to them. If their trading decisions are consistently wrong, then individual day traders
must have biased interpretations. Hence, the second null hypothesis is that on average day traders
should have gross profits no less than zero.
Again, the first column in Table 4 shows rejection of the second hypothesis. The day traders
suffer an average loss of 26,700 TWD before transaction costs. Median losses are not as great but
still significant. Only around 29 per cent of day traders make positive gross profits. Overall, the
evidence indicates that individual day traders have a biased interpretation of information, resulting
in negative gross profits. As before, we find that long-initiated trades perform more poorly than
short-initiated trades at an investor level. This result suggests that individual day traders are more
overconfident when initiating long positions.
The above analysis of overconfident behavior of individual day traders is based on the perfor-
mance of their round-trip trades. According to the definition of round-trip trade, a day trader may
accumulate many futures contracts before completing a round-trip trade by bringing his or her
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open interests back to zero. In other words, day traders may have different margin account sizes
in terms of the amount of deposited initial margin for their round-trip trades. Such heterogeneity
of account size may result in the performance heterogeneity of day traders as shown in Table 4
and distort our inference. To mitigate the potential dependence of profit from day trades on the
account size, we also calculate the index return and the net return of each round-trip day trade for
individual day traders. 9
The index return of a round-trip day trade for a day trader is defined as the aggregate gained or
lost index points divided by the average longing or short-selling index point. This return should be
able to largely alleviate the scaling concern even though it does not fairly reflect the true realized
return for a day trader. In view of this, we also calculate the net return, which is defined as the net
profit from a single round-trip trade divided by the total initial margin required to complete the
trade, to gauge the realized return of a trader. For a typical individual trader who always deposits
just enough money in his/her margin account for round-trip day trades, this net return would be
identical to his/her realized return. Note that this net return is calculated under the assumption
that there is no margin call whatsoever due to the lack of margin account information.
Table 5 presents the distributions of index return and net return for individual day traders.
The information from Table 5 is generally in line with that contained in Table 4. An individ-
ual day trader on average incurs a significant loss of -3.73% after transaction costs. This result
combined with the also significant median loss of -2.32% strongly corroborates a conclusion that
individual day traders are overconfident about the precision of their information signals. Like the
results shown in Table 4, both index return and net return from long-initiated trades are signifi-
cantly lower than those from short-initiated trades at per investor level. It implies that individual
day traders are indeed more overconfident when initiating long positions. These results indicate
that our findings on the overconfident behavior of individual day traders in the TAIFEX are not
sensitive to the account sizes of round-trip trades.
In summary, the day traders in our sample voluntarily restrict liquidation timing to enjoy the
9We thank the referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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extra leverage provided by the halved initial margin. The information story cannot explain the ex
ante nature of day trading and the poor average performance we document ex post. The conclusion
we draw from Table 4 is that individual day traders are both overconfident in the precision of
information and biased in interpretation of their information. The results are consistent with the
findings in Odean (1999) and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) for regular individual equity
traders.
4.4. Overconfident institutional day traders
Table 6 shows that the overall performance for the 42 institutional traders is also poor. The aver-
age net profit is −89,100 TWD and the average gross profit is 4,200 TWD. The wider difference
between the gross profit and the net profit, compared with individual day traders, is because in-
stitutional investors trade more. With the small number of observations, however, neither average
gross profit nor average net profit is statistically significant.
When we look at the direction of trades separately, institutional day traders perform better
when taking long positions than when taking short positions. The performance however varies
widely and the average is seriously affected by a few outliers. The wide variation of payoff
also contributes to the low statistical power. According to the medians that are more robust to
the outlier problem, we find contradictory evidence that both gross profit and net profit for long-
initiated day trades (-5500 TWD and -7937 TWD) are lower than those for their counterparts (-850
TWD and -4481 TWD) although so not significantly. Overall, such contradictory and insignificant
results make us hesitate to conclude that institutional day traders, like individual day traders, are
overconfident about not only the precision of their information, but also their interpretation of the
information.
We also investigate the influence of account size for a single round-trip day trade on the results
as shown in Table 6. Comparing the results in Table 6 and Table 7, we find that the pattern of
median returns is quite similar to the pattern of median profits, while the pattern of average returns
is different from that of average profits. Apparently, this result is due to the susceptibility of mean
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statistics to outliers. Take the long-initiated day trades for example, the significant negative mean
net return may be resulted from few institutional day traders who usually have large positions for
round-trip day trades and trade actively. Despite this difference, we find that account size does
not change our main conclusions about the behavior of institutional day traders drawn from their
aggregate profit of round-trip trades.
Taking these results at face value, although the institutional day traders in the TAIFEX may be
overconfident in the precision of their information, their interpretation of information is unbiased.
Besides, according to the median profits and median returns, they are less overconfident when
initiating short positions than when initiating long positions. Nevertheless, these conclusions are
drawn from a sample that is too small to produce high enough statistical significance.
4.5. Trading is hazardous only to overconfident day traders
Given that individual day taders are overconfident, we now ask whether they lose more if they
trade more frequently, as Barber and Odean (2000) document for US equity stock traders. We
are essentially interested in whether day traders suffer more losses by trading more futures con-
tracts.10
Table 8, Panel A, is analogous to Figure 1 in Barber and Odean (2000). We sort total contracts
traded by individual investors into quintiles and report averages within each quintile for total gross
profit, profit per contract, net profit, net profit per contract, and number of round-trip trades. The
losses increase with the number of contracts traded for the first four quintiles, from 16,400 TWD
to 62,600 TWD. For the most frequent trading-quintile, those day traders manage to make a total
gross profit of 31,200 TWD on average, but the gain for the most aggressive day traders is all
consumed by the transaction costs. The negative net profits increase monotonically from 18,300
TWD to 108,200 TWD. The conclusion here is similar to Barber and Odean’s (2000) that trading
is hazardous to day traders’ wealth.
The relation between the number of contracts traded and the performance is, however, quite
10Because of the small numbers of institutional day traders, we deal henceforth only with individual day traders.
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different when we look at the profit per contract.11 The extent of negative profit per contract, both
before or after transaction costs, drops as the number of contracts traded increases.
Overall, two core lessons can be learned here. First, day traders suffer from less loss per
contract when they trade more. Second, day traders in the most frequent trading-quintile could
make even more money by trading more. This result is consistent with the finding of Linnainmaa
(2005) that the most active day traders come close to being profitable.
To further explore this relation, we sort day traders into quintiles by total profit or average
profit instead of contract numbers. Panels B and C of Table 8 report the results.
Panel B shows that only the fifth-quintile day traders earn a significant amount of profit. The
average gross profit within that quintile is 267,000 TWD, compared with an abysmal −324,900
TWD for the first quintile. After transaction costs, the fifth-quintile day traders still make a
188,500 TWD profit. This is consistent with the results in Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2011),
who find some day traders in the Taiwan equity market have superior trading skills. Coval, Hirsh-
leifer, and Shumway (2005) also find that certain skillful individual investors can exploit market
inefficiencies to earn abnormal profits.
Transaction costs, however, consume roughly 30 per cent of the gross profit. Profit per contract
increases monotonically from a negative 504 TWD to 308 TWD while net profit per contract
increases from a negative 593 TWD to 218 TWD. Performance heterogeneity across the sample
day traders is evident. A similar pattern is seen in Panel C as well.
One particularly intriguing finding is the pattern of contract numbers in Panels B and C. Fig-
ure 1 and Figure 2 convey the most essential point. Sorted by total profit, contract numbers take a
smirk pattern. In other words, the top-quintile winners and the bottom-quintile losers both trade
quite actively. This implies that trading is hazardous only to the wealth of the losers, not to the
wealth of the winners. Although investors need to trade more to earn large gains or incur signifi-
cant losses, the smirk is not due to this simple mechanism. When we sort day traders by average
profit per contract, we continue to see a smirk pattern in Figure 2.
11If we assume that the margin deposited for each trade remains at the same level for all time, the profit per contract
serves as a reasonable proxy for the return.
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To formally test the relation between profits and number of contracts traded among winners
and losers, we use quantile regressions. The advantages are twofold. First, such a test is less
affected by outliers. Second, any quantile can be estimated with higher statistical power over
least square regression within subgroups. We run 19 different quantile regressions of total gross
profit or total net profit on a constant term and contract numbers traded, from the 5th percentile
to the 95th percentile.12
For the sake of space, we show only the coefficients of interest and the confidence intervals in
Figure 3 for the total gross profit and Figure 4 for the total net profit. Both figures agree with the
smirk patterns we see in Figures 1 and 2. In the case of day traders below the 15th percentile in
gross or net profit, the more they trade, the more losses they suffer. Yet, for day traders above the
60th percentile, the more they trade, the more profit they can make.
For instance, day traders in the 95th percentile (the most-winning day traders) make an extra
400 TWD gross profit by trading one more contact. Day traders in the 5th percentile (the most-
losing day traders), however, incur an extra 800 TWD gross loss if they take one more position.
Collectively, the documented relation between profits and contract numbers does not fully corrob-
orate that trading is hazardous to investors’ wealth. Trading is hazardous only to overconfident
losers’ wealth, but not to informed or skillful winners.
4.6. Excessive day trading is related to past trading volume but not profit
Can we tell whether day trading activity and profits are related to investors’ past trading record?
In other words, we would like to know whether overconfident day trading is due to learning as
shown in Gervais and Odean (2001).
We first identify 2,641 day traders of the 3,470 with trading records from January 2000
through September 2007. These day traders have the opportunity to learn about their trading
skills from past trading experience. Panel A of Table 9 reports the performance of individual day
traders in this subsample.
12Koenker (2005) provides a detailed description of quantile regression.
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Interestingly, the day traders with trading records perform more poorly than those without
trading records. The average gross (net) profit is −38,400 (−73,400) TWD, both more negative
than the profts reported in Table 4. These experienced investors seem to gain no superior skills
from their past trading. This result seems inconsistent with the argument of Linnainmaa (2011)
that investors may trade to learn about their abilities as active traders, even if they expect to lose
from their active investing.
Next, we regress the number of round-trip day trades or total net profits of day traders on
the number of contracts traded, number of trading days, and gross profits earned during January
2000 through September 2007. Numbers of contracts traded and number of trading days serve as
proxies for the trading experience, while the gross profits help investors to know their “type” in the
context of Gervais and Odean (2001). Independent variables are standardized for the convenience
of interpretation, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity following Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993).
Table 10 shows that both past numbers of contracts traded and number of trading days are
strongly correlated with day-trade activity. A one-standard deviation increase in the number of
contracts traded over January 2000 - September 2007 leads to 61 more round-trip day trades.
Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in the of number of trading days leads to 25 more
round-trip day trades. The more experienced individual investors exhibit more aggressive day
trading behavior, but day trading activity is only weakly related to profits earned in the past. The
higher past profit alone does not contribute to more intensive day trading activity.
Finally, day trading profit is correlated with the number of contracts traded. A one-standard
deviation increase in the past number of contracts traded would lead to a 270,000 TWD higher
day-trade profit. The day-trade profit is unrelated to past trading profits. The overconfident day
traders do not learn their types from their past performance. Another interpretation is that they do
not gain trading skills or better information processing technology.
The evidence suggests overall that trading experience plays a limited role in helping individual
investors earn profits by taking advantage of the extra leverage produced by the new day trading
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policy. It also gives support to the hypothesis of Gervais and Odean (2001) that biases in the
learning process of investors may lead them to become overconfident.
4.7. Comparison of complete day-trader sample and subsample
Our general analysis requires at least five executed day trades in order for investors to be included
in the sample. We relax this ad hoc threshold to examine whether our results are robust to other
choices of threshold, and recast the analysis in Table 4 but report only the main statistics for
brevity.
Panel B of Table 9 indicates that the performance of all individual day traders who conduct at
least one day trade is as poor as that shown in Table 4. On average, they incur significant losses of
48,800 TWD after transaction costs. Before transaction costs, they lose 26,700 TWD on average.
Panel C reports the results when we increase the threshold to ten day trades. The sample size
is reduced, but we see similar results. The pattern of day traders losing more in long positions
than in short positions also persists.
To sum up, the documented overconfidence of individual futures day traders in Taiwan appears
to be structurally stable and not an artifact of the sample.
5. Concluding remarks
We have taken advantage of a relatively recent day-trading policy in the Taiwan futures market
to study the performance of day traders. The policy gives us a clear-cut way to identify day
traders ex ante. Essentially, investors commit to be day traders by flagging their orders as day-
trade orders, or positions that need to be closed on the same trading day. We thus have an ideal
laboratory to address our questions. Are day trades profitable? Are day traders overconfident as
to the precision of their information? Do they have a biased interpretation of information? Do
they lose more money by trading more contracts? In other words, is trading hazardous to their
wealth? Are there any differences in the relation between trading frequency and performance for
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winning and losing day traders? Finally, do day traders’ past trading experience and performance
affect their trading behavior?
Several elements related to the Taiwanese market policy motivate us. First, investors like these
day traders who voluntarily assume liquidation risk are supposed to be either the most informed
or the most confident that they are informed. Second, the maximum investment horizon for the
investors must be one day by default. The day traders’ positions can be observed without the
potential bias of the disposition effect. Third, futures day traders can easily capitalize on their
negative information by taking short position. Finally, these traders are unlikely to trade for
consumption, liquidity, portfolio rebalancing, diversification, hedging, and or tax motives.
The results show that the 3,470 individual day traders suffer substantially negative gross and
net profits. This implies that individual day traders are not only overconfident as to the precision
of information but also biased in their interpretation of information. The result for institutional
day traders is similar but statistically insignificant because of the much smaller number of obser-
vations.
We also find that numbers of short positions and long positions are similar for individual day
traders. To our surprise, the short-initiated round-trip trades perform better than the long-initiated
round-trip trades for individual investors. Our results do not fully support that investors lose more
by trading more. Trading is hazardous only to the overconfident losers, but not to the winners.
Finally, we find that more experienced day traders exhibit more aggressive day trading behav-
ior, while overconfident day traders do not learn their types from their past performance. Trading
experience thus plays a limited role in helping individual investors earn profits by taking advan-
tage of the extra leverage enabled by the market’s day trading policy.
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Table 1 All Index Futures Descriptive Statistics
Total Investor Type Product Type
Transactions Individual Institutional TXF MXF EXF FXF Others
2007/10 1,870,994 1,381,276 489,718 1,078,166 506,157 129,863 141,018 15790
2007/11 2,470,271 1,779,260 691,011 1,454,938 711,988 139,628 139,699 24018
2007/12 2,716,747 1,804,619 912,128 1,525,523 936,893 123,451 113,037 17843
2008/01 4,176,970 2,544,218 1,632,752 2,235,007 1,361,298 298,008 225,626 57031
2008/02 1,791,517 1,270,273 521,244 925,136 548,780 129,299 110,563 77739
2008/03 3,403,473 2,515,959 887,514 1,839,396 1,131,589 197,695 201,394 33399
2008/04 2,886,335 2,174,869 711,466 1,510,854 955,650 175,457 205,264 39110
2008/05 2,864,748 2,095,692 769,056 1,522,378 934,713 168,154 189,498 50005
2008/06 2,970,428 2,125,787 844,641 1,607,198 1,027,271 146,669 154,925 34365
2008/07 3,272,217 2,374,412 897,805 1,785,649 1,158,925 137,089 151,129 39425
2008/08 3,349,750 2,552,303 797,447 1,798,758 1,203,782 174,041 132,168 41001
2008/09 3,640,049 2,628,370 1,011,679 1,978,549 1,302,017 168,387 147,844 43252
Total 35,413,499 25,247,038 10,166,461 19,261,552 11,779,063 1,987,741 1,912,165 472,978
Average 2,951,125 2,103,920 847,205 1,605,129 981,589 165,645 159,347 39,415
Ratio 100.000% 71.292% 28.708% 54.390% 33.262% 5.613% 5.400% 1.336%
Notes. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of all trades in the Taiwan futures market from October 8th, 2007 to September 30th, 2008.
The number of total transaction, the number of transactions by domestic individual and institutional day traders, and the number of
transactions in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (TXF), the mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (MXF), the Electronic
Sector Futures (EXF), the Finance Sector Futures (FXF), and the other types of futures are reported respectively. The number of
transactions are reported on each month while the total and average over the months are also presented.
25
Table 2 Day-trade Index Futures Descriptive Statistics
Number of Contracts Number of Transactions Investor/Day Investor
Date Individual Institutional Individual Institutional Individual Institutional Individual Institutional
2007/10 38,454 1,180 26,356 618 2,907 40 742 7
2007/11 115,502 5,182 76,243 3,094 7,339 85 1255 11
2007/12 99,043 3,602 69,780 2,516 7,715 74 1368 12
2008/01 149,068 678 95,680 514 8,129 54 1485 13
2008/02 67,692 491 49,675 327 5,703 58 1292 18
2008/03 140,022 1,623 96,775 1,038 9,218 134 1609 17
2008/04 117,438 1,102 82,383 807 9,485 115 1585 15
2008/05 114,628 6,378 80,227 3,222 9,028 105 1573 15
2008/06 127,341 4,026 89,410 2,355 9,120 65 1571 11
2008/07 142,063 1,610 98,211 1,258 8,527 64 1640 18
2008/08 150,233 13,286 110,233 7,304 10,605 134 1671 16
2008/09 160,646 4,812 110,746 3,733 9,868 108 1683 17
Total 1,422,130 43,970 985,719 26,786 97,644 1,036 17,474 170
Average 118,511 3,664 82,143 2,232 8,137 86 1,456 14
Max 160,646 13,286 110,746 7,304 10,605 134 1,683 18
Min 38,454 491 26,356 327 2,907 40 742 7
Notes. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the day trades for four Taiwan index futures, including TFX, MFX, EFX, and FXF,
from October 8, 2007 to September 30, 2008. The number of contracts, number of transactions, number of investor/day, and the number
of investors per month for domestic individual and institutional day traders are reported separately. The identify of day traders in each
month could be largely overlapped over months. In total, we have 3,470 distinct individual day traders and 42 institutional day traders.
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Table 3 Profit and Net Profit for Round-trip Trades
Panel A: All round-trip trades
Individual Institutional
(thousands TWD) Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean ***-0.266 ***-0.613 0.043 -0.905
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.994) (0.869)
Median ***0.300 ***0.189 ***0.400 ***0.284
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 2,298 2,065 12,160 12,086
Min -5,180 -5,235 -10,464 -10,653
number of obs 348,063 348,063 4,134 4,134
Panel B: Long-initiated round-trip trades
Individual Institutional
(thousands TWD) Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean ***-0.676 ***-1.014 6.824 5.841
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.374) (0.444)
Median ***0.300 0.148 ***0.450 *0.294
p-value (0.000) (0.392) (0.000) (0.051)
Max 1,908 1,799 12,160 12,086
Min -5,180 -5,235 -2,769 -2,833
number of obs 177,415 177,415 1,862 1,862
Panel C: Short-initiated round-trip trades
Individual Institutional
(thousands TWD) Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean ***0.160 ***-0.196 -5.515 -6.433
p-value (0.005) (0.001) (0.475) (0.409)
Median ***0.350 ***0.193 ***0.400 ***0.248
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 2,298 2,065 10,385 10,314
Min -2,596 -2,689 -10,464 -10,653
number of obs 170,648 170,648 2,272 2,272
Notes. Table 3 reports the profit and net profit of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated round-trip
trades. Net profit is the gross profit minus the transaction fee and tax. The profit and net profit for
domestic individual day traders and institutional day traders are reported separately. *: significant
at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 4 Distribution of Profit and Net Profit for Domestic Individual Investors
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
(thousands TWD)
below −500 78 105 44 54 24 28
−500 to −450 16 20 7 13 4 4
−450 to −400 25 17 13 15 4 7
−400 to −350 26 30 21 27 6 10
−350 to −300 29 36 29 33 11 13
−300 to −250 48 59 37 34 9 14
−250 to −200 71 92 48 61 27 31
−200 to −150 107 154 90 96 42 56
−150 to −100 228 269 186 207 94 115
−100 to −50 485 540 381 444 239 288
−50 to 0 1361 1473 1,623 1,722 1,479 1,688
0 to 50 697 473 792 608 1,093 872
50 to 100 133 80 70 56 140 92
100 to 150 33 27 28 17 51 32
150 to 200 27 23 17 12 19 13
200 to 250 19 10 12 12 19 11
250 to 300 12 6 6 5 8 9
300 to 350 7 7 6 5 5 6
350 to 400 9 5 8 1 8 3
400 to 450 6 5 1 1 4 5
450 to 500 5 2 2 1 5 3
above 500 48 37 22 19 35 26
Mean *−26.654 ***−61.470 ***−34.813 ***−52.253 8.229 *−10.040
p-value (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.281) (0.095)
Median ***−18.675 ***−29.996 ***−13.000 ***−19.219 ***−2.950 ***−6.709
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 29,171 23,121 14,547 11,580 14,623 11,541
Min −20,991 −23,384 −19,201 −20,982 −2,993 −3,351
Observations 3,470 3,470 3,443 3,443 3,326 3,326
Notes. Table 4 reports the total profit and net profit of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated trades
of domestic individual investors. The profit and net profit are reported in the bin of 50 thousand
TWD. *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 5 Distribution of Index Return and Net Return for Domestic Individual Investors
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Index Return Net Return Index Return Net Return Index Return Net Return
below −10% 12 406 15 581 8 331
−10% to −9% 1 76 6 79 4 58
−9% to −8% 3 114 7 97 2 80
−8% to −7% 2 103 3 128 2 91
−7% to −6% 8 134 9 137 2 115
−6% to −5% 8 171 8 179 5 117
−5% to −4% 14 218 16 204 10 171
−4% to −3% 13 303 20 254 12 182
−3% to −2% 36 338 37 296 27 306
−2% to −1% 93 408 105 325 55 337
−1% to 0% 2248 438 2174 379 1813 404
0% to 1% 972 308 969 259 1302 331
1% to 2% 32 149 43 168 38 224
2% to 3% 11 108 14 96 17 146
3% to 4% 7 57 4 68 10 92
4% to 5% 4 30 4 36 4 68
5% to 6% 1 35 0 28 5 62
6% to 7% 4 9 1 22 1 43
7% to 8% 0 15 1 17 5 31
8% to 9% 0 11 3 13 1 25
9% to 10% 0 5 1 12 1 20
above 10% 1 38 3 65 2 92
Mean ***−0.216% ***−3.727% ***−0.266% ***−4.652% ***−0.113% ***−2.345%
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Median ***−0.029% ***−2.316% ***−0.036% ***−2.766% ***−0.012% ***−1.358%
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 10.376% 29.432% 20.271% 52.429% 43.723% 54.344%
Min −51.735% −66.132% −51.735% −81.054% −110.449% −86.180%
Observations 3470 3470 3443 3443 3326 3326
Notes. Table 5 reports the index return and net return of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated
trades of domestic individual investors. The rates of return are reported in the bin of one per cent.
The index return is calculated by dividing index points gained or lost by corresponding average
long and short selling index points. The net return is calculated by dividing the net profit in Table 4
by the total margin, which is equal to the havled initial margin for one contract multiplied by the
total number of contracts for a single round-trip trade. During the whole sample period, the initial
margins for the TXF, MTX, EXF, and FXF futures contracts remain as 78,000 TWD, 20,000
TWD, 64,000 TWD, and 64,000 TWD, respectively. *: significant at 10% level, **: significant
at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 6 Distribution of Profit and Net Profit for Institutional Day Traders
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
(thousands TWD)
below −500 1 1 0 0 1 1
−500 to −450 0 0 0 0 0 0
−450 to −400 0 0 0 0 0 0
−400 to −350 1 1 0 0 0 0
−350 to −300 0 0 0 0 0 0
−300 to −250 0 1 0 0 0 0
−250 to −200 0 0 0 1 0 0
−200 to −150 1 3 3 2 1 1
−150 to −100 0 1 0 2 0 1
−100 to −50 5 5 4 2 3 3
−50 to 0 20 18 20 21 17 19
0 to 50 7 6 8 9 12 11
50 to 100 1 1 2 0 3 1
100 to 150 1 0 0 0 0 0
150 to 200 0 1 0 1 0 0
200 to 250 1 0 0 1 1 2
250 to 300 0 0 0 0 0 0
300 to 350 0 0 2 0 0 1
350 to 400 0 0 0 0 1 0
400 to 450 0 1 0 0 1 0
450 to 500 0 0 0 0 0 0
above 500 4 3 2 2 2 2
Mean 4.218 −89.058 309.921 265.272 −298.324 −348.015
p-value (0.988) (0.785) (0.234) (0.265) (0.557) (0.513)
Median −11.875 **−15.264 −5.500 *−7.937 −0.850 −4.481
p-value (0.100) (0.041) (0.223) (0.054) (0.703) (0.504)
Max 5,240 5,069 10,460 9,569 5,156 5,072
Min −9,962 −11,956 −187 −204 −20,422 −21,525
Observations 42 42 41 41 42 42
Notes. Table 6 reports the total profit and net profit of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated trades
of institutional day traders. The profit and net profit are reported in the bin of 50 thousand TWD.
*: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 7 Distribution of Index Return and Net Return for Institutional Day Traders
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Index Return Net Return Index Return Net Return Index Return Net Return
below −10% 1 3 2 6 1 3
−10% to −9% 0 1 0 0 0 1
−9% to −8% 0 1 0 2 1 1
−8% to −7% 0 1 0 2 0 1
−7% to −6% 1 2 0 1 0 3
−6% to −5% 0 3 0 1 0 2
−5% to −4% 0 1 0 3 0 3
−4% to −3% 0 3 1 3 0 0
−3% to −2% 0 5 0 4 0 3
−2% to −1% 1 6 2 3 0 5
−1% to 0% 25 4 24 4 19 5
0% to 1% 11 3 10 3 18 3
1% to 2% 1 2 1 1 2 4
2% to 3% 1 2 1 4 0 2
3% to 4% 0 3 0 3 0 1
4% to 5% 0 0 0 0 0 1
5% to 6% 0 0 0 1 0 0
6% to 7% 0 1 0 0 0 0
7% to 8% 0 0 0 0 0 1
8% to 9% 0 0 0 0 0 1
9% to 10% 0 0 0 0 0 0
above 10% 1 1 0 0 1 2
Mean −0.96% ***−2.34% −3.83% ***−4.60% 1.21% −1.37%
p-value (0.583) (0.002) (0.220) (0.003) (0.804) (0.155)
Median −0.02% ***−1.75% **−0.03% ***−2.16% 0.00% **−1.29%
p-value (0.0352) (0.004) (0.022) (0.002) (0.925) (0.049)
Max 29.19% 10.12% 2.54% 5.99% 167.63% 19.30%
Min −66.24% −14.21% −125.54% −51.23% −111.74% −13.01%
Observations 42 42 41 41 42 42
Notes. Table 7 reports the index return and net return of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated
trades of domestic individual investors. The rates of return are reported in the bin of one per cent.
The index return is calculated by dividing index points gained or lost by corresponding average
long and short selling index points. The net return is calculated by dividing the net profit in Table 6
by the total margin, which is equal to the havled initial margin for one contract multiplied by the
total number of contracts for a single round-trip trade. During the whole sample period, the initial
margins for the TXF, MTX, EXF, and FXF futures contracts remain as 78,000 TWD, 20,000
TWD, 64,000 TWD, and 64,000 TWD, respectively. *: significant at 10% level, **: significant
at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 8 Quintile of Contract Number, Profit, Net Profit, Profit per Contract, Net Profit per
Contract, and Round-trip Trade Number
Panel A: Sorted by number of contract
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q
Number of Contract 24.14 59.40 120.02 251.22 1613.61
Profit (thousands TWD) -16.43 -33.90 -51.54 -62.58 31.17
Profit per Contract (TWD) -680.71 -570.63 -429.38 -249.10 19.32
Net Profit (thousands TWD) -18.26 -38.45 -60.63 -81.78 -108.23
Net Profit per Contract (TWD) -756.20 -647.35 -505.16 -325.54 -67.07
Round-trip Trade Number 10.83 24.25 47.70 94.89 323.87
Panel B: Sorted by total net profit
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q
Number of Contract 644.82 236.01 210.05 110.96 866.56
Profit (thousands TWD) -324.90 -57.35 -16.56 -1.46 267.01
Profit per Contract (TWD) -503.86 -243.02 -78.85 -13.19 308.12
Net Profit (thousands TWD) -382.11 -74.81 -30.50 -8.43 188.51
Net Profit per Contract (TWD) -592.59 -316.98 -145.21 -75.98 217.54
Avg Round-trip Trade Number 148.47 90.36 72.02 47.22 143.46
Panel C: Sorted by net profit per contract
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q
Number of Contract 312.22 206.57 261.64 409.50 878.47
Profit (thousands TWD) -277.40 -86.84 -37.02 0.35 267.64
Profit per Contract (TWD) -888.48 -420.36 -141.49 0.84 304.66
Net Profit (thousands TWD) -307.39 -104.40 -57.62 -26.40 188.47
Net Profit per Contract (TWD) -984.54 -505.38 -220.24 -64.47 214.54
Avg Round-trip Trade Number 43.33 67.42 90.65 151.26 148.87
Notes. Table 8 reports the average values of the total profit, total net profit, profit per contract,
net profit per contract, and total round-trip trades in each quintile groups for domestic individual
investors. Panel A reports the results sorted by the number of total contracts traded by individual
day traders during the sample period. Panel B shows the results sorted by the total profit. The
Panel C shows the results sorted by the profit per contract.
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Table 9 Robustness Check: the Distribution of Profit and Net Profit for Domestic Individual
Investors
Panel A: With Trading Record
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean **-38.394 ***-73.364 ***-43.558 ***-61.200 5.078 **-13.194
p-value (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) (0.028)
Median ***-20.750 ***-32.639 ***-14.875 ***-20.724 ***-3.200 ***-6.998
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 23,718 15,028 11,114 7,229 12,605 8,984
Min -20,991 -23,384 -19,201 -20,982 -2,634 -3,182
Obs 2,641 2,641 2,622 2,622 2,523 2,523
Panel B: Threshold Zero
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean **-23.462 ***-48.786 ***-29.032 ***-42.413 4.450 **-10.107
p-value (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.457) (0.032)
Median ***-10.150 ***-16.674 ***-7.600 ***-11.419 ***-2.450 ***-5.050
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 29,171 23,121 14,547 11,580 14,623 11,541
Min -20,991 -23,384 -19,201 -20,982 -2,993 -3,351
Obs 4,867 4,867 4,585 4,585 4,252 4,252
Panel C: Threshold Ten
All Trades Long-intiated Short-intiated
Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit Profit Net Profit
Mean -28.192 ***-71.849 ***-39.332 ***-61.025 11.227 -11.251
p-value (0.143) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.247) (0.140)
Median ***-24.950 ***-39.899 ***-18.175 ***-25.857 ***-3.550 ***-9.293
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max 29,171 23,121 14,547 11,580 14,623 11,541
Min -20,991 -23,384 -19,201 -20,982 -2,993 -3,351
Obs 2,653 2,653 2,644 2,644 2,601 2,601
Notes. Table 9 reports the total profit and net profit of all, long-initiated, and short-initiated
trades of domestic individual investors. Panel A reports the results of all individual day traders
with trading record from 2000/01/01 to 2007/10/07. Panel B reports the results of individual day
traders with at least one day trade. Panel C reports the results of individual day traders with at
least ten day trades. *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1%
level.
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Table 10 Overconfident Day Trading is Related to Past Trading Activity but not Profits
Number of round-trip trades Total net profits
Number of contracts ***61.0 ***60.8 *270339.1 *270355.6
(0.000) (0.000) (0.093) (0.093)
Number of trading days ***25.3 ***24.9 10722.2 9646.7
(0.004) (0.004) (0.561) (0.611)
Past Profits 7.4 **2.9 6.0 19742.5 -224.2 19202.2
(0.683) (0.011) (0.671) (0.886) (0.997) (0.889)
Number of observations 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641
Adj-R-Squared 4.93% 0.85% 0.07% 4.94% 0.89% 15.36% 0.02% 0.08% 15.36% 0.10%
Notes. Table 10 reports the regression results with number of round-trip day trades or total net day-trade profits as the dependent
variable. The independent variables includes number of contracts traded, number of trading, and days total gross profits from 2000/01/01
to 2007/10/07. The independent variables are standardized. The observations contains 2,641 individual day traders who have trading
record from 2000/01/01 to 2007/10/07. The standard error is adjusted for heteroscedasticity by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). *:
significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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314.5 270.8 318.2
499.1
1187.8
-1200.4
-613.4
-295.5
-13.0
343.6
-1299.0
-712.8
-393.9
-109.3
243.3
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Contract Number Average Profit Average Net Profit
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Figure 3 The Coefficients of Quantile Regression of the Profit on Number of Contracts
traded and the 95%Confidence Intervals
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Figure 4 The Coefficients of Quantile Regression of the Net Profit on Number of Contracts
traded and the 95%Confidence Intervals
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